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Simplifying Choices in Defined Contribution Retirement Plan Design 
 
Donald B. Keim and Olivia S. Mitchell 
 
Working Americans have increasingly relied on employment-based defined contribution 
(DC) retirement plans as the more traditional defined benefit (DB) pensions have declined over 
the past 50 years.1 A distinguishing feature of DC plans in the U.S. is that participants must decide 
how much to contribute and where to invest their retirement assets, instead of holding the employer 
responsible for plan investments. Employees make these decisions within the menu of investment 
options offered by plan sponsors, and employers often automatically enroll participants into 
‘default’ investments if people do not elect an option. Recent research in social psychology has 
argued that too many choices may create confusion, resulting in poorly-informed consumer 
decisions. Additionally, prior analyses how participants who are automatically enrolled end up 
allocating their DC savings (Madrian and Shea, 2001).  
Relatively little is known about how changing the fund lineup can shape employee 
investment choices in DC plans. We seek to fill this gap using administrative data provided by a 
plan sponsor. The information enables us to examine how participants contributed to a menu of 
funds and what happened to their fund allocations, along with the costs and risks of the resulting 
portfolios, as a result of a firm-wide DC plan streamlining effort. In all, the plan menu in the firm 
was reduced considerably, with almost half of the funds deleted from the lineup.  This streamlining 
process was intended to simplify the fund menu, and also to make possible a more coherent 
categorization or ‘tiering’ of the retained funds.  
                                                          
1 The US Department of Labor (2014) reports that in 1975, 74% of all participants in private sector 
plans were covered by DB plans; by 2012, only 6% of participants were in DB pensions.  
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We examine plan participants’ investment choices prior to and after the streamlining event 
and evaluate what happened to participant fund allocations, risk exposure, and costs as a result of 
the reform. We seek answers to several questions regarding the impact of the investment menu 
changes. First, we explore what types of individuals held the deleted funds and how (if at all) they 
differed from other participants.  We refer to the holders of these deleted funds as the streamlined 
participants, and their counterparts as the non-streamlined plan members. Second, we wish to 
ascertain how streamlined participants responded to the changes, and how they reallocated their 
retirement assets after the reform. Third, we evaluate whether the streamlining process affected 
investors’ portfolio turnover, risk, and expenses. Fourth, we ask whether streamlined participants 
responded to the change by reallocating to comparable funds, or moved to the new brokerage 
accounts.  
We show that participants subject to the streamlining proved to be older, more likely to be 
male, and higher-income; they also held higher balances in riskier funds and lower balances in 
safer balanced/target date funds. Participants holding the deleted funds initially reallocated to safer 
assets, and only 9% elected the new brokerage window (taking only 0.2% of assets). Post-
streamlining, participants adjusted their portfolio holdings even more, ending up with fewer funds, 
significantly lower turnover rates, and lower expense ratios. Based on reasonable assumptions, 
these portfolio adjustments could lead to potential accumulated savings for these participants over 
a 20-year period of $20.2M, or more than $9,400 per participant. Also, after the reform and relative 
to the non-streamlined participants, streamlined participants’ portfolios held significantly less 
equity and exhibited significantly lower risks by way of lower diversifiable/idiosyncratic risk and 
reduced exposures to systematic/non-diversifiable risk factors.   
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In what follows, we first offer a brief literature review, followed by a discussion of our data 
and descriptive statistics. We then use multivariate regression models to estimate differences in 
the changes in portfolio characteristics and risks for participants affected by the streamlining 
compared to those who were not, controlling for several factors differentiating the participants. 
We conclude with thoughts on how a streamlining intervention such as this might shape 
employees’ eventual retirement wellbeing.  
 
1. Related Prior Literature 
Financial economics suggests that participants in a pension plan should rationally focus on 
their own portfolios’ risk-return profiles independent of the number of funds in their pension plan 
menu. Yet Benartzi and Thaler (2001) suggested that plan participants actually followed a naïve 
diversification approach, investing 1/n of their assets in each of the n funds made available in the 
menu. Similarly suboptimal investment decisions are reported by Tang, Mitchell, Mottola, and 
Utkus (2010) who showed that even when plan sponsors offered a sufficiently diversified 
(efficient) menu of funds, participants regularly selected inadequately-diversified portfolios given 
their selected level of risk. 
In addition, recent research in social psychology has argued that too many choices can 
create confusion and distraction, resulting in poorly-informed consumer decisions (e.g., Iyengar 
and Lepper, 2000). In the context of DC fund menus, Iyengar, Huberman, and Jiang (2004) asked 
whether such “choice overload” affected participant decisions in the 401(k) environment.  They 
used a 2001 cross-section of data on 649 DC plans managed by the Vanguard Group to ascertain 
whether participation rates were lower in plans when more funds were on the menu. They found 
that, for every 10 additional funds on a menu, participation dropped two percent. While most of 
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the plans examined had 10-30 options, participation rates were actually highest for those with 10 
or fewer options.  
In a follow-up analysis using the same dataset, Huberman and Jiang (2006) explored fund 
investment patterns rather than participation rates. There, conditional on participation, the authors 
concluded that (p. 763) “the number of funds used, typically between three and four, is not 
sensitive to the number of funds offered by the plans, which ranges from 4 to 59. A participant’s 
propensity to allocate contributions to equity funds is not very sensitive to the fraction of equity 
funds among offered funds.”  They also reported that (p 765) “Once plans offer an abundance of 
choices (more than 10 funds), there is no correlation between equity allocation and exposure.” 
Ultimately the authors concluded that plan sponsors need not be overly concerned about the length 
of the plan menu, as long as a reasonable diversity of options was included.  
In a related study, Brown, Liang, and Weisbenner (2007) employed SEC 11-k filings on 
891 plans from 1991-2000. The panel nature of their dataset permitted the authors to use fixed-
effect regressions which confirmed that (p. 1995) “the number of equity and bond options in the 
401(k) plan is an important predictor of contributions to equity and bond funds, respectively, even 
after accounting for firm-level fixed effects.” They also found that, over the time period they 
examined, most funds added to 401(k) plans were expensive, actively-managed equity funds, 
resulting in higher average portfolio expenses and lower average portfolio performance. They 
concluded that (p. 2006) “the choice of investment options to make available in an individual 
accounts program is likely to have a first-order effect on the portfolio allocations that individuals 
make.”  
In a more recent study, Morrin, Inman, Broniarczyk, Nenkov, and Reuter (2012) examined 
how employees covered by the Oregon University System DC plan altered their behavior when 
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their plan menu was expanded from 10 to 19 fund choices. Both before and after the expansion, 
the default was a money market fund. When the smaller menu was offered, 21% defaulted to the 
money fund, while with the larger menu, 34% defaulted. Accordingly, the authors concluded that 
offering more funds (p 548) “may be overwhelming for many investors.” Of those who did make 
an election, participants selected on average 37% (3.7 funds) of the funds from the 10-fund menu, 
and 27% (5.3) from the 19-fund menu. While those results did not support the 1/n heuristic, they 
are consistent with perhaps a weaker form of the heuristic whereby increasing the number of 
offered funds led participants to hold more funds. Moreover, the authors concluded that it is 
sensible for plan sponsors to offer a sufficient variety of choices, but there is a need to “clearly 
categorize the options to help the [participants] perceive the set of offerings at a higher, more 
abstract level. Partitioning the funds may enhance asset class diversification while not reducing 
(and actually increasing) the total number of funds invested in. Subjectively grouping funds by 
asset class is more likely to assist novice investors than expert investors in their financial decision 
making.” 
In sum, research to date has provided mixed conclusions about how the number and mix 
of DC fund options influences investment patterns in retirement accounts.2 Moreover, no study 
has yet examined how participants react to a rather substantial reduction of retirement plan 
investment choices. In what follows, we explore this question with a unique new dataset that 
permits us to follow investor behavior before and after a substantial streamlining in the fund menu. 
 
2. The Setting 
                                                          
2 See also Beshears et al. (2013) who evaluated how a simple saving rate and asset allocation 
protocol in a DC plan affects the probability of participating and contribution rates conditional 
on participation; they did not, however, look at asset allocation patterns.  
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 The employer we study is a large US nonprofit institution. Like its peers, it has long offered 
a DC structure to cater to participants’ retirement saving needs on a pre-tax basis. Prior to 2013, 
the plan included almost 90 mutual funds in the investment menu, ranging from equity to target 
date to bond index funds, as well as REIT, commodity, and other sector funds. Cognizant of the 
growing literature on choice overload (see references in section 1), the firm’s investment 
committee in 2011 determined that a simpler, easier-to-understand tiering of the funds on offer 
would be easier to administer, explain, and rationalize compared to the prior menu.  
To this end, the committee streamlined the plan menu and constructed a simpler tiering 
structure for the remaining funds. Participants who had invested in the funds that would be 
eliminated from the menu would be allowed to reallocate their assets and contributions to any other 
fund in the menu, and anyone who did not move his assets out of the fund that would be deleted 
would have his assets automatically transferred to the age-appropriate Target Date Fund (TDF).3 
Alternatively, participants who elected to do so could also move their assets to a new self-directed 
brokerage account within the plan which would give them access to not only the closed funds, but 
also thousands of other mutual funds. In what follows we describe the changes in the investment 
lineup.  
The result was the elimination of 39 funds from the initial lineup, based on the funds’ 
expense ratios, the number of participants, and the aggregate amount invested in each fund. 
Remaining funds were allocated across a new 4-tier structure, where each successive tier would 
afford participants additional choice. Tier 1, selected as the default tier for participants not actively 
                                                          
3 This was defined as the TDF with the target date closest to the year the participant would attain 
age 65. Under the Pension Protection Act of 2006, the US Department of Labor permits TDFs as 
QDIAs (qualified default investment alternatives) that can be used for participants who do not 
elect their own investment mix.  
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electing an investment mix, included 13 low-cost Target Date Funds. Additional tiers offered 
increasing flexibility of choice for participants seeking to make more customized and sophisticated 
allocations. Tier 2 included four indexed funds: Money Market, U.S. Diversified Stocks, U.S. 
Bonds, and Diversified International Stocks. Tier 3 included 32 funds arranged into separate “risk” 
categories illustrated in more detail in Table 1. The range of categories included: small/mid/large-
cap and value/growth stock funds; small/mid/large-cap international stock funds; 
short/intermediate/long-maturity and Treasury/corporate bond funds; balanced funds; and a 
passive equity REIT fund to provide access to the real estate asset class. Tier 4 constituted the 
brokerage account.  
[Table 1 here] 
The plan sponsor announced its streamlined fund lineup in July 2012, with an 
implementation date of mid-October 2012. In addition to a newsletter sent to all participants, the 
employer created a custom website, broadcasted online webinars, sent targeted emails, held 
participant meetings, and sent hard copy mail to explain the changes.  
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
To analyze the change in behavior post- versus pre-streamlining, we obtained access to 
information on the retirement plan account balances and periodic contributions of all the (identity-
censored) participants. Our dataset included information on contributions, balances, and asset 
allocation prior to the streamlining, defined in our analysis below as end-June 2012, and after the 
change, defined as end-December 2012. To this file we appended information from public sources 
(via ticker and CUSIP numbers) for each fund’s equity fraction and style (bond, balanced, stock, 
etc.), as well as monthly return histories. The fund administrator also provided individual 
demographic information on participants’ age, sex, education (more than college versus not), and, 
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from external sources, imputed household income (assigned according to the participant’s zip 
codes, where low <$50K, middle $50-100K, and high >$100K).4  
Using the participant balance and contribution data, we also construct variables to identify 
participants whose holdings were directly affected by the streamlining, as well as participants who, 
pre-streamlining, had actively adjusted their portfolio allocations. Specifically, we define 
Streamlined as a variable equal to 1 if the plan participant held funds at end-April 2012 that were 
subsequently deleted due to streamlining, and equal to 0 otherwise.  We define Active as a variable 
equal to 1 if the plan participant made at least two exchanges in at least one month during the 
period July 2011–June 2012 prior to the streamlining, and equal to 0 otherwise.  
To better illustrate how the reform worked, we begin by reviewing descriptive statistics on 
the balances in the retained and deleted funds by risk category, and we also compare key attributes 
of participants and their retirement plan investments as of end-June 2012 (our baseline). Table 2 
reports aggregate balances held in retained and deleted funds by risk category, where of the almost 
$1 billion invested at end-June 2012, most of the assets (80%) were held in retained funds. Overall, 
20% of the total assets were in funds that were subsequently deleted; of those, about 60% had been 
in equity (stock, balanced, or international) funds, 24% in alternatives/sector funds, and 14% in 
bond funds (with the remainder in money market funds).   
[Table 2 here]  
In Table 3 we report aggregate dollar balances, the number of total participants, and the 
number of funds held by all plan participants at end-June 2012 (rightmost column), along with the 
same information for the streamlined participants (who owned at least one deleted fund) and the 
                                                          
4 These were derived from data supplied to the plan administrator from IXI Corporation 
(http://www.ixicorp.com/products-and-services/customer-targeting-and-
scoring/wealthcomplete/) derived from zip+4 Census tract information.  
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non-streamlined participants (who owned no deleted funds). The number of participants in each 
group was roughly similar (2,238 versus 2,271), but the streamlined group had accumulated almost 
60% more in assets ($603.8 versus $380.0 million), contributed 30% more on a monthly basis 
($1802 versus $1356 per participant), and held more funds (87 in total versus 47). On average, 
about one-third of the contributions of the streamlined participants were in funds that were 
subsequently deleted and two-thirds in retained funds. 
[Table 3 here] 
 A comparison of characteristics for streamlined versus non-streamlined active participants 
appears in Table 4. The streamlined participants were significantly older, more likely to be male, 
and lived in higher-income households. They also held three times as many funds (6.8 versus 2.1) 
compared to the non-streamlined participants. Regarding asset allocations, Table 5 indicates that 
the streamlined participants were significantly more likely to contribute to stock funds (both 
domestic and international), and less likely to elect target date funds compared to the non-
streamlined participants. In other words, the streamlined participants held portfolios containing 
higher-volatility securities, on average.   
[Tables 4 and 5 here] 
 
4. Changes in Portfolio Allocations: A First Look 
 Table 6 reports how participants changed their retirement plan portfolios after the 
streamlining went into effect.  In particular, we compare the allocation of retirement plan assets 
prior to (measured at end-June 2012), and after streamlining (end-December 2012). Overall, non-
streamlined participants made virtually no changes to their portfolios. In contrast, the streamlined 
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participants significantly reduced allocations to international, bond, and especially stock and sector 
funds, (in total a 27.1% reduction in contributions), shifting contributions mainly to TDFs.5  
[Table 6 here] 
Within the streamlined group, Table 7 shows that higher-income group members were less likely 
to tilt toward the safer TDF funds, and they retained a relatively higher exposure to equity funds 
in the post-streamlining period relative to before. 
[Table 7 here] 
 
5. Changes in Participant Portfolio Characteristics and Risks: Multivariate Analysis 
Next we use multivariate regression analyses to analyze in more detail the post- versus pre-
streamlining changes in the characteristics and risks of the portfolios of streamlined and non-
streamlined participants.  To measure these differences we use the variable Streamlined, along 
with the variable Active (the participant made at least two exchanges in at least one month July 
2011–June 2012) to test whether the streamlining process affected the portfolios of the active 
participants differently than the non-active participants, plus an interaction between Streamlined 
and Active. Our analysis also controls for various observed attributes of individual participants: 
age and age-squared (to test for possible nonlinear effects); male or female; educational level 
                                                          
5 A small portion of the aggregate assets, $2.3M, was also allocated to the brokerage account; 
relatively few participants did so (only 9% of those holding deleted funds prior to the change 
subsequently opened a brokerage account following the change). This may be because, at the time 
the brokerage accounts were announced, restrictions were imposed on the number of exchanges 
permitted in and out of certain funds each year. Also participants were informed that holdings in 
the brokerage account would incur special redemption fees of 1% (minimum $50, maximum $250) 
for no-transaction-fee funds; for transaction-fee funds, the participant would be charged $20 per 
transaction. These fees were eliminated prior to the actual change.  In both cases the minimum 
investment was $1,000. Additional loads would depend on the share classes elected by each 
participant.   
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(graduate degree or not); and high versus low household income.6 We estimate the change in 
portfolio characteristics over two intervals: end-June 2012 to end-December 2012 (the points in 
time analyzed in Tables 6 and 7); and also end-June 2012 to end-December 2013 (a longer interval 
that allows more time for participants to adjust their portfolio allocations post-streamlining). 
5.1 Changes in Portfolio Characteristics 
In Table 8 we compare the effects of the reform on participant portfolio turnover rates, 
expense ratios, number of funds held, and percentage allocation to stocks for the portfolios of 
streamlined versus non-streamlined participants. Panel A (B) reports model estimates for the 
shorter (longer) post-streamlining period.   
[Table 8 here] 
Over the shorter interval (Table 8A), we find that, relative to their unaffected counterparts, 
streamlined participants displayed significantly greater reductions in portfolio turnover, larger 
reductions in expense ratios, and a larger decline in the number of funds held.  Moreover, these 
reductions were larger for the subset of streamlined participants also classified as active traders.  
For example, the reduction in the expense ratio was 36.2 bps larger for the streamlined participants 
relative to non-streamlined, and this decline was nearly one basis point greater for the active 
members of the streamlined sample.  While the change in the percentage of the portfolio allocated 
to stocks over the shorter interval was not different for the streamlined versus the non-streamlined 
participants, there are interesting changes in stock allocations for the active participants. 
Specifically, the active subsample overall significantly increased its stock allocations by 3.8% by 
                                                          
6 Recall, from section 3, that the low income group had household income of <$50K; the middle 
group of $50-100K, and the high income group of >$100K. 
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the end of December 2012, the active members of the streamlined group experienced a statistically 
and economically significant 5.5% reduction in stock allocations as a result of the streamlining.   
One possible reason for this difference could be that the active traders who were in the 
streamlined group re-established a portion of their equity allocations via transactions in the 
brokerage window. We lack data on these non-plan investments, but it will be recalled that few 
assets were moved to the brokerage option.  We also find that the reductions in stock allocations, 
expense ratios, and number of funds held were greater for men than for women, consistent with 
Barber and Odean’s (2001) report that male individual investors in the stock market traded more 
aggressively than did female investors.  
The main message of Table 8B is simple: the changes in portfolio characteristics caused 
by the reform that were evident over the shorter interval in Panel A largely remained intact for the 
entire 2013 calendar year. Accordingly, the initial effects of the reform were not undone by 
participant transactions over the subsequent twelve months. 
Not only are these effects statistically significant: they are also economically important. 
That is, the (unconditional) average reduction in the annual expense ratio for the streamlined group 
was 4.0bp (=27.9bp – 23.9bp), or a $0.242M annual cost savings (based on the pre-streamlining 
balance for the streamlined group of $603.8M at end-June 2012). Given that the average age of 
the streamlined participants was 49 in April 2012, if these savings could be achieved on an ongoing 
basis over 20 years and reinvested at 5% annually, the accumulated benefit would amount to 
$8.40M or around $4,000 per participant. Additionally, the (unconditional) average decline in 
annual turnover for the streamlined group was 11.3% (=35.2% – 23.9%). Based on the streamlined 
group balance of $603.8M at end-June 2012 and assuming round-trip transaction costs of 0.50%, 
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this could translate into an annual aggregate cost savings of $0.341M.7 If such savings could be 
achieved on an ongoing basis over 20 years and reinvested at 5% annually, the accumulated 
additional benefit would be $11.8M, or $5,400 per participant. In total, then, the per-participant 
savings could be over $9,400 per participant. 
5.2 Changes in Portfolio Risks 
We also examine how participant portfolio risks changed by comparing pre- versus post-
streamlining positions. To this end, we first estimate the factor-related systematic risks and 
diversifiable (idiosyncratic) risks for both retained and deleted funds, using a model similar to 
Fama-French (1993) in which the estimated coefficients measure each fund’s exposures to 
systematic factor risks:  
ittttttFtMtFtit eDefbTermbWmLbHmLbSmBbRRbRR ~)
~(~ 654321 ++++++−+=− α  
Here it FtR R− refers to the excess return of fund i over the risk-free rate (the one-month Treasury 
bill rate from Ibbotson Associates); FtMt RR −
~  refers to the value-weighted return on all NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks (from CRSP) minus the risk-free rate;  SmB refers to the difference 
in the performance of small relative to big stocks; HmL to the difference in performance of value 
stocks to growth stocks; WmL is a momentum factor premium measuring the difference in 
performance of past winner and past loser stocks; Term measures the difference between the 
monthly long-term government bond return (from Ibbotson Associates) and the one-month 
Treasury bill rate measured at the end of the previous month (from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices, CRSP); and Def measures the difference between the return on a market portfolio 
of long-term corporate bonds (the Composite portfolio in the corporate bond module of Ibbotson 
                                                          
7 We compute this as $603.8 x (0.113 x 2 x 0.025). 
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Associates) and the monthly long-term Treasury bond return.  The fund’s diversifiable 
(idiosyncratic) risk is measured as σ(e), the standard deviation of the regression residuals. 
Having estimated the model parameters representing systematic and idiosyncratic risks, we 
next compute for each participant the systematic and idiosyncratic risks specific to his own 
portfolio, using his portfolio weights s of end-June 2012 and end-December 2012. Finally, we 
regress the post−pre changes in systematic and idiosyncratic risks on Streamlined, Active, the 
interaction between Streamlined and Active, and our control variables. Results appear in Table 9, 
where Panel A (B) reports model estimates for the shorter (longer) post-streamlining period. 
[Table 9 here] 
Table 9A shows that the streamlined participants’ portfolios after the reform exhibited 
significantly lower systematic risk relative to the non-streamlined participants. In aggregate, 
streamlined participants’ portfolios exhibited significantly less ‘tilt’ toward systematic sources of 
variation.  By contrast, there is little evidence of post- versus pre-streamlining change in systematic 
risk exposures between the active and non-active participants. An exception, however, is seen in 
exposure to the market risk factor, mimicking the changes in broad stock market exposure 
described in Table 8. Overall, the active participants increased their market beta by 0.036 by the 
end of December 2012, but the active members of the streamlined group significantly reduced 
market beta by 0.075 as a result of the streamlining. We also find that the reform resulted in a 
significant reduction in idiosyncratic risk for the streamlined group relative to their non-
streamlined peers, and this reduction was even greater for active members of the streamlined 
group.  Finally, we also find that the reduction in idiosyncratic risk was greater for male versus 
female participants, as were reductions in exposures to the market, momentum stock risk factors, 
and both bond risk factors. These last findings are again consistent with the results in Barber and 
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Odean (2001), albeit in the retirement plan setting rather than for online brokerage accounts. It is 
also worth pointing out that many of these changes in risk exposure are most pronounced for 
participants with larger, versus smaller, portfolio balances.  
As with our discussion above about portfolio characteristics, the main message from Table 
9B is clear: the changes in portfolio risks produced by the reform seen for the shorter interval in 
Panel A largely remained intact through the entire 2013 calendar year. Accordingly, the initial 
effects of the reform were not undone by participant transactions over the subsequent 12 months. 
To summarize the results in this section, the streamlining of the DC plan described here 
had a statistically significant and economically potent impact on the characteristics and risks of 
participant portfolios. Specifically, turnover in participants’ retirement portfolios (a significant 
cause of largely unseen transaction costs), and the expense ratios of those portfolios, were 
significantly reduced; and systematic/non-diversifiable as well as idiosyncratic/diversifiable risks 
were also significantly curtailed. As such, our results complement and extend previous studies 
which suggested that simplification enhances retirement saving (e.g., Beshears et al. 2013), though 
previous work has focused only on participation and contributions, but not on asset allocation 
outcomes as here. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This study examines the salutary effects of streamlining the DC fund menu by deleting 
some funds and tiering options in an easier-to-understand format. While recent studies have 
evaluated how simplification can influence participation and contributions, they have not 
examined how streamlining changes investment patterns. Our analysis examines how halving the 
fund menu while including a new brokerage account changed investment behavior at a large 
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nonprofit institution. We find that participants who initially held at least one deleted fund were 
relatively older, more likely to be male, and earned higher incomes; they also held higher balances 
in riskier funds and lower balances in safer/balanced/target date funds. Interestingly, in response 
to the changed lineup, only 9% of these participants moved any money at all into the new brokerage 
window, taking only 0.2% of assets. Moreover, streamlined participants’ new allocations 
contained significantly fewer funds and had significantly lower exposure to non-market systematic 
risks; they also contained a much lower allocation to stocks. Streamlined participants’ new 
allocations also exhibited significantly lower turnover rates and expense ratios, which, based on 
reasonable assumptions, could lead to potential accumulated savings for these participants over a 
20-year period of $20.2M, or over $9,400 per participant. 
The changes we have discerned are important, particularly given regulators’ growing 
interest in retirement plan fees and costs. As one example, recent US Department of Labor 
guidance to plan participants alerted members to the possibility that costs may rise as investment 
options become more numerous.8 Such costs, in turn, can reduce the size of the nest egg available 
for retirement. Additionally, employers in their plan fiduciary capacity are charged under pension 
law with managing retirement plans in the best interests of participants.9 Our work implies that 
                                                          
8 For instance, the US Department of Labor (USDOL) states on its website 
(http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/401k_employee.html): “In recent years, there has been a 
dramatic increase in the number of investment options typically offered under 401(k) plans as well 
as the level and types of services provided to participants. These changes give today’s employees 
who direct their 401(k) investments greater opportunity than ever before to affect their retirement 
savings. As a participant you may welcome the variety of investment options and the additional 
services, but you may not be aware of their cost. As shown above, the cumulative effect of the fees 
and expenses on your retirement savings can be substantial.” 
9 That is, plan sponsors must “ensure that fees paid to service providers and other expenses of the 
plan are reasonable in light of the level and quality of services provided; and select investment 
options that are prudent and adequately diversified; disclose plan, investment, and fee information 
to participants to make informed decisions regarding their investment options under the plan; and 
17 
 
plan sponsors would do well to recognize that the length and complexity of the plan menu matters. 
Accordingly, our results should be of substantial interest to those seeking to improve defined 
contribution retirement plan design, including employers, fund providers, consultants, and 
regulators. 
 
                                                          
monitor investment options and service providers once selected to see that they continue to be 
appropriate choices.”  
 (http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/401k_employee.html) 
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Table  1. Description of Fund Menu Post- (and Pre-) Streamlining      
 
     
__________________________________________________________________________ 
1 Three Money Market funds were eliminated.   
2 Thirty-nine funds were eliminated.   
Note: Post (pre) allocation computed as of end-December (June) 2012.    
Source: Authors’ calculations.   
    Tier 1 : 13 Target Date Funds
    Tier 2 : 4 Funds (Money Market, U.S. Diversified Stocks, U.S. Bonds, Int'l Stocks)1
    Tier 3 :  32 Funds [Number of funds kept (Number of  funds eliminated)]2
Bond Funds
Short Intermed Long
Treasury 0 (2) 2 (1) 1 (1)
Corporate 1 (1) 1 (1) 2 (0)
Other Bonds (High Yield) 1 (0)
Stock Funds
Large Mid-Cap Small
Diversified 1 (3) 3 (0) 1 (0)
Value 3 (9) 1 (1) 1 (3)
Growth 4 (2) 1 (1) 2 (1)
Balanced Funds 2 (2)
International Stock Funds 1 (3) 2 (2) 1 (2)
Other (Althernative Assets, Sector Funds) 1 (4)
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Table 2. Total Balances in Retained (and Deleted) Funds by Risk Category (as of end-June 2012; 
$M) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Tier 1
Target date  101.0 (0)
Tier 2 (Index/Passive)
Money Market    33.2 (4.8)
Bond Market  34.0 (0)
Stock Market  37.2 (0)
International stocks  14.0 (0)
Tier 3
    Bonds Short Interm. Long
Treasury         0 (6.7) 26.7 (0)   7.5 (9.3)
Corporate    10.6 (3.1)    9.2 (7.7) 15.3 (0)
Other Bonds    15.2 (0)
    Stocks Large-Cap Mid-Cap Small-Cap
Diversified  81.7 (2.3) 42.0 (0) 12.2 (0)
Value   89.8 (31.4)    9.2 (9.6)    5.2 (6.6)
Growth  101.5 (20.7)    2.4 (1.9) 20.0 (1.4)
    Balanced  64.2 (20.3)
    International   7.4 (13.6)  22.7 (0) 15.6 (7.7)
    Other 12.7 (46.0)
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Table 3.  Balances, Number of Participants, and Number of Funds Owned:  Streamlined vs Non-Streamlined Participants (as of 
end-June 2012) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Total Balance ($Millions)
# Participants
# Funds
Contribution ($, per part.) Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
To all funds 1,802 1,395 1,356 849 1,573 1,084
To Deleted funds 588 330
To Nondeleted funds 1,214 833
4,609
87 47 87
Streamlined Group Non-Streamlined Group Overall
380.0 983.7
 (N=2,238)
603.8
 (N=2,371)  (N=4,609)
2,238 2,371
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Table 4. Differences in Mean Characteristics: Streamlined vs Non-Streamlined Participants (as of end-June 2012) 
 
 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The low income group is defined to have household income of <$50K; the middle group $50-
100K, and the high income group >$100K.  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Streamlined Non-Streamlined
Age
   18-30 0.02 0.08 -0.06 ***
   31-40 0.20 0.25 -0.05 ***
   41-50 0.33 0.29 0.04 ***
   51-60 0.32 0.28 0.04 ***
   > 60 0.13 0.11 0.03 ***
Sex
   Male 0.55 0.45 0.10 ***
   Female 0.45 0.55 -0.10 ***
Education
   Low 0.43 0.50 -0.07 ***
   High 0.41 0.33 0.08 ***
Household Income
   Low 0.16 0.19 -0.04 ***
   Med 0.35 0.37 -0.01
   High 0.46 0.39 0.07 ***
Number of Funds 6.78 2.11 4.66 ***
Diff. (S-NS)
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Table 5. Difference in Distribution of Mean Participant Asset Allocations: Streamlined vs 
Non-Streamlined Participants (as of end-June 2012) 
 
 
 
Note:  * p<0.10;  ** p<0.05;  *** p<0.01 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Streamlined Nonstreamlined
% of contribution  in:  (N=2,238) (N=2,371)
Stock Funds 0.45 0.28 0.18 ***
Sector Funds 0.07 0.00 0.07 ***
Other Funds 0.01 0.00 0.01 ***
TDF Funds 0.10 0.55 -0.46 ***
Other Balanced Funds 0.08 0.04 0.04 ***
International Funds 0.11 0.04 0.07 ***
Bond Funds 0.17 0.08 0.09 ***
Difference
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Table 6. Difference in Mean Participant Asset Allocations: Post- Minus Pre- Streamlining (end-December vs end-June 2012) 
 
 
Note:  * p<0.10; ** p<0.05;  *** p<0.01 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
% of contribution  in: 
Stock Funds -0.150 *** -0.004 **
Sector Funds -0.073 *** 0.000
Other Funds 0.007 *** 0.001 **
TDF Funds 0.297 *** 0.002
Other Balanced Funds -0.035 *** 0.000
International Funds -0.036 *** -0.001
Bond Funds -0.016 *** 0.001
Brokerage Account 0.006 *** 0.000
Streamlined (N=2181) Non-Streamlined (N=2295)
Diff(Post-PreStreamlining) Diff(Post-PreStreamlining)
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Table 7. Change in Mean Participant Asset Allocations by Income: Post- minus Pre-
Streamlining (end-December vs end-June 2012) 
 
 
 
    
Note: Note:  * p<0.10; ** p<0.05;  *** p<0.01 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
% of contribution in: 
Stock Funds 0.0534 *** 0.0037
Sector Funds 0.0124 0.0000
Other Funds -0.0006 0.0013 *
TDF Funds -0.0813 *** 0.0007
Other Balanced Funds 0.0035 0.0004
International Funds -0.0114 * 0.0020
Bond Funds 0.0192 * -0.0088 **
Brokerage Account 0.0047 0.0007
Diff(High Income-Low Income) a Diff(High Income-Low Income) a
Streamlined (N=2181) Non-Streamlined (N=2295)
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Table 8A. Changes in Fraction of Portfolio Invested in Stocks, Annual Turnover, Expense Ratios, and Number Funds Held (end-
December 2012 minus end-June 2012 balances) 
 
    Δ%Stock ΔTurnover ΔExpRatio ΔNfunds 
Explanatory Variables Mean         
Streamlined 0.49 0.0029  -0.1079 *** -0.0362 *** -1.2166 *** 
Active 0.11 0.0379 ** 0.0090  -0.0002  0.1711  
Streamlined*Active 0.08 -0.0550 *** -0.0314 ** -0.0090 * -0.9785 *** 
Age 47.64 0.0008  0.0043 * 0.0001  0.0195  
Age**2 2383.79 0.0000 * -0.0001 ** 0.0000  -0.0001  
Male 0.50 -0.0093 ** 0.0016  -0.0026 * -0.1175 ** 
Education gradschool 0.37 -0.0053  0.0100 * -0.0020  -0.0372  
HH income low 0.18 -0.0013  -0.0107  -0.0041 * 0.1093  
HH income high 0.42 -0.0030  0.0054  0.0004  0.0630  
Balance/100k 2.10 0.0007  -0.0005  -0.0005  -0.0136  
N  4,476  4,447  4,476  4,476  
R-squared  0.02  0.09  0.15  0.16  
Mean of dep var   -0.007   -0.056   -0.021   -0.600   
 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variables as follows: Δ%Stock is the % of the participant’s portfolio of funds invested 
in common stocks; ΔTurnover measures participant changes in overall annual portfolio turnover (post-pre);  ΔExpRatio measures the 
change in annual participant expense ratios (post-pre) and Δ#funds measures the change in the number of funds held (post-pre).  Values 
computed for each participant using end-December 2012 minus end-June 2012 balances. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 8B. Changes in Fraction of Portfolio Invested in Stocks, Annual Turnover, Expense Ratios, and Number of Funds Held 
(end-December 2013 minus end-June 2012 balances) 
 
    Δ%Stock ΔTurnover ΔExpRatio ΔNfunds 
Explanatory Variables Mean         
Streamlined 0.49 0.0201 *** -0.0983 *** -0.0249 *** -1.2043 *** 
Active 0.11 0.0735 *** -0.1117 *** 0.0067  0.3561 * 
Streamlined*Active 0.08 -0.0632 *** 0.0489  -0.0010  -1.0488 *** 
Age 47.66 -0.0014  -0.0007  -0.0076 *** 0.0111  
Age**2 2384.89 0.0000  0.0000  0.0001 *** 0.0000  
Male 0.50 -0.0171 *** 0.0025  -0.0067 ** -0.1115 * 
Education gradschool 0.37 -0.0086 * 0.0190 *** 0.0025  0.0025  
HH income low 0.18 -0.0051  -0.0008  -0.0075 * 0.0730  
HH income high 0.42 -0.0058  0.0129  -0.0042  0.0984  
Balance/100k 2.11 0.0022 *** -0.0060 *** -0.0061 *** -0.0224 * 
N  4,434  4,406  4,434  4,434  
R-squared  0.02  0.10  0.12  0.11  
Mean of dep var   0.007   -0.113   -0.076   -0.487   
 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Dependent variables as follows: Δ%Stock is the % of the participant’s portfolio of funds invested 
in common stocks; ΔTurnover measures participant changes in overall annual portfolio turnover (post-pre);  ΔExpRatio measures the 
change in annual participant expense ratios (post-pre) and Δ#funds measures the change in the number of funds held (post-pre).  Values 
computed for each participant using end-December 2013 minus end-June 2012 balances. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 9A. Change in Participant Portfolio Systematic and Idiosyncratic Risk Exposures (end-December 2012 minus end-June 2012 balances)  
    Δβ(Mkt) Δβ(SmB) Δβ(HmL) Δβ(WmL) Δβ(Term) Δβ(Def) ΔRMSE 
Explanatory Variables Mean               
Streamlined 0.49 -0.0090 * -0.0037 ** -0.0197 *** -0.0157 *** -0.0032 ** -0.0180 *** -0.0032 *** 
Active 0.11 0.0361 ** -0.0025  -0.0002  -0.0003  -0.0074  0.0037  0.0001  
Streamlined*Active 0.08 -0.0753 *** 0.0025  0.0086 * -0.0042  -0.0092  -0.0141 ** -0.0016 *** 
Age 47.64 0.0013  -0.0002  0.0011 ** 0.0001  0.0001  0.0011 ** 0.0000  
Age**2 2383.79 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 ** 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Male 0.50 -0.0156 *** 0.0005  -0.0006  -0.0022 *** 0.0019  -0.0043 *** -0.0006 *** 
Education gradschool 0.37 -0.0098 * -0.0008  0.0026 * 0.0000  0.0005  0.0002  -0.0002  
HH income low 0.18 -0.0108  -0.0001  0.0025 * 0.0014  0.0012  0.0019  0.0001  
HH income high 0.42 0.0014  0.0007  0.0025  0.0012  -0.0001  0.0018  0.0002  
Balance/100k 2.10 -0.0019 * 0.0011 *** 0.0001  0.0006 *** -0.0007 *** -0.0007 * 0.0000  
N  4,476  4,476  4,476  4,476  4,476  4,476  4,476  
R-squared  0.025  0.005  0.046  0.090  0.018  0.047  0.136  
Mean of dep var   -0.0145   -0.0017   -0.0075   -0.0079   -0.0016   -0.0081   -0.0017   
 
             
 
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Post-Pre dependent variables measured as follows: Δβ(Mkt) measures changes in participants’ 
exposure to market risk;  Δβ(SmB) measures changes in participants’ exposure to the difference in performance of small relative to big 
stocks; Δβ(HmL) measures changes in participants’ exposure to the difference in performance of value stocks to growth stocks; ; 
Δβ(Term) refers to changes in participants’ exposure to the difference in returns on a market portfolio of long-term corporate bonds and 
the one-month Treasury bill rate measured at the end of the previous month; and Δβ(Def) measures changes in participants’ exposure 
to the difference between the monthly long-term government bond return and the one-month Treasury bill rate; and ΔRMSE is the 
standard deviation of the residuals from the 6-factor model in section 5.2. Values are computed for each participant using end-December 
2012 minus end-June 2012 balances. Source: Authors’ calculations; see variable descriptions in text. 
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Table 9B. Change in Participant Portfolio Systematic and Idiosyncratic Risk Exposures (end-December 2013 minus end-June 2012 balances)  
    Δβ(Mkt) Δβ(SmB) Δβ(HmL) Δβ(WmL) Δβ(Term) Δβ(Def) ΔRMSE 
Explanatory Variables Mean               
Streamlined 0.49 0.0184 * 0.0061 *** 0.0022  -0.0108 *** -0.0072 *** -0.0155 *** -0.0035 *** 
Active 0.11 0.0785 *** 0.0027  0.0036  0.0031 * -0.0630 *** -0.0160 *** -0.0001  
Streamlined*Active 0.08 -0.0659 * 0.0037  0.0077  -0.0049 * 0.0373 *** -0.0009  -0.0014 ** 
Age 47.66 -0.0246 *** 0.0003  0.0021 *** -0.0002  0.0001  0.0008  -0.0001 ** 
Age**2 2384.89 0.0002 *** 0.0000  0.0000 *** 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 ** 
Male 0.50 -0.0397 *** 0.0020  0.0015  -0.0020 *** 0.0046 ** -0.0037 ** -0.0009 *** 
Education gradschool 0.37 0.0032  0.0004  0.0012  -0.0005  0.0023  0.0015  -0.0001  
HH income low 0.18 -0.0145  -0.0014  0.0023  0.0000  0.0026  0.0053 ** 0.0003  
HH income high 0.42 -0.0295 *** 0.0025  0.0021  0.0009  0.0005  0.0013  0.0002  
Balance/100k 2.11 -0.0182 *** 0.0013 *** 0.0000  0.0008 *** -0.0017 *** -0.0015 *** -0.0001 *** 
N  4,434  4,434  4,434  4,434  4,434  4,434  4,434  
R-squared  0.076  0.011  0.010  0.060  0.056  0.051  0.138  
Mean of dep var   -0.2074   0.0145   0.0101   -0.0037   -0.0168   -0.0168   -0.0032   
 
             
 
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Post-Pre dependent variables measured as follows: Δβ(Mkt) measures changes in participants’ 
exposure to market risk;  Δβ(SmB) measures changes in participants’ exposure to the difference in performance of small relative to big 
stocks; Δβ(HmL) measures changes in participants’ exposure to the difference in performance of value stocks to growth stocks; ; 
Δβ(Term) refers to changes in participants’ exposure to the difference in returns on a market portfolio of long-term corporate bonds and 
the one-month Treasury bill rate measured at the end of the previous month; Δβ(Def) measures changes in participants’ exposure to the 
difference between the monthly long-term government bond return and the one-month Treasury bill rate; and ΔRMSE is the standard 
deviation of the residuals from the 6-factor model in section 5.2. Values are computed for each participant using end-December 2013 
minus end-June 2012 balances. Source: Authors’ calculations; see variable descriptions in text. 
 
 
